HomeMy WebLinkAboutCity of Tamarac Resolution R-2021-128Temp. Reso. #13707
October 27, 2021
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CITY OF TAMARAC, FLORIDA
RESOLUTION NO. R-2021 - ?''
A RESOLUTION OF THE CITY COMMISSION OF
THE CITY OF TAMARAC, FLORIDA,
SUPPORTING THE EFFORTS OF THE PUBLIC
RIGHTS PROJECT AND THE SOUTHERN
POVERTY LAW CENTER TO DECLARE AS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL THE PROVISIONS OF
CHAPTER 2021-6, LAWS OF FLORIDA (A/K/A
HOUSE BILL ONE) THAT INTERFERE WITH A
FLORIDA MUNICIPALITY'S ABILITY TO ADOPT
THE OPERATING BUDGET OF THE
MUNICIPALITY'S LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY; PROVIDING FOR CONFLICTS;
PROVIDING FOR SEVERABILITY; AND
PROVIDING FOR AN EFFECTIVE DATE.
WHEREAS, the City of Tamarac actively monitors and comments onFederal,
State, and local legislation that may impact the City and its residential andbusiness
communities; and
WHEREAS, during the 2021 State of Florida Legislative Session, the Florida
Legislature adopted Chapter 2021-6, Laws of Florida (a/k/a House Bill One or "HB1 ");
and
WHEREAS, HB1 interferes with the home rule powers of every municipality in
the State of Florida vis-a-vis their ability to adopt an annual budget that includes the
operating budget of a municipal law enforcement agency free of interference from
the State; and
WHEREAS, the Public Rights Project and The Southern Poverty Law Center
have informed the City Commission that they intend on challenging the
constitutionality of HB1.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE CITY COMMISSION OF
Temp. Reso. #13707
October 27, 2021
Page 2 of 3
THE CITY OF TAMARAC, FLORIDA THAT:
SECTION 1: The foregoing "WHEREAS" clauses are hereby ratified and
confirmed as being true and correct and are hereby made a specific part of this
Resolution.
SECTION 2: The City of Tamarac supports the efforts of the Public Rights
Project and the Southern Poverty Law Center to protect and preserve the home rule
powers of every Florida municipality by having HB1 declared unconstitutional.
SECTION 3: If any clause, section, other part, or application of this
Resolution is held by any court of competent jurisdiction to be unconstitutional or
invalid, in part or application, it shall not affect the validity of the remaining portionsor
applications of this Resolution.
The remainder of this page left intentionally blank
Temp. Reso. #13707
October 27, 2021
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SECTION 4: This Resolution shall become effective immediately upon
adoption.
PASSED, ADOPTED AND APPROVED this 27th day of October 2021.
ATTEST:
k _ ,
N F JO'4 O CMC
CITY CL RIB
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have
approved this RESOLUTION
MICHELLE J. EZ
MAYOR
RECORD OF COMMISSION VOTE
MAYOR GOMEZ ,/)
DIST 1:
COMM. BOLTON
DIST 2:
COMM. GELIN
DIST 3:
V/M VILLALOBOS
DIST 4:
COMM. PLACKO
TO: Tamarac City Commission
FROM: Public Rights Project, Community Justice Project, and the Southern Poverty Law
Center
RE: The Case for Challenging HB 1
I. Executive Summary
The Combating Violence, Disorder, and Looting and Law Enforcement Protection Act, also
known as HB 1, obstructs municipalities' ability to control their budgets —a core local power. HB
1 gives the governor and his cabinet the power to line -edit municipal budgets with binding legal
effect whenever a reduction to the law enforcement budget is challenged by the state attorney,
member of the City Commission, or possibly even a county sheriff.' This review process chills
local government action.
Municipalities need full control of their budgets so that they can function properly.
Municipal revenue can be variable, which is why cities need full authority to structure their
budgets to weather changes. When revenues are down in periods of economic hardship,
municipalities need flexibility to tighten spending wherever such measures would be most
efficient, whether those tightening measures affect law enforcement or parks and recreation.
When municipalities receive opportunities to apply for one-time grants to supplement a city
budget or need to make a large expenditure to update the infrastructure or technology in a
department, they need the flexibility to make this increase without being locked into maintaining
a higher spending level. Furthermore, municipalities need flexibility to reorganize their
departments if certain programs would fit better under the purview of another department.
Municipalities also require full control of their budgets in order to be responsive to the
needs of their residents. Budgets reflect community priorities and values. If residents need greater
investment in municipal human services as they struggle in the wake of a pandemic and economic
downturn, then it is the municipality's duty and prerogative to formulate a budget that is
responsive to residents' needs and values.
In the summer of 2020, the murders of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor, among others,
catalyzed many Floridians to call on their local governments to rebalance budgeting priorities to
invest in public safety strategies that prioritize social and human services separate from law
enforcement. These residents pointed out that law enforcement has been relied on as a first
responder for non-violent incidents that could be addressed with a public health or social service
approach, but that these community approaches need funding. Many municipalities responded
by exploring how non -law enforcement functions such as service programs could be transferred
from the law enforcement budget to other municipal departments.
From the faraway state capital, Governor Ron DeSantis preempted the discussions
between local governments and residents with HB 1. Though his intent was to stymie discussions
'Matt Dixon, Florida Panel Paves Way for Law Enforcement to Appeal Local Po/ice Budget Cuts, Politico
(June 15, 2021), https://www.politico.com/states/florida/story/2021/06/15/florida-panel-paves-way-for-
law-enforcement-to-appeal-local-police-budget-cuts-1386464.
started by the movement for racial justice, the effect will be much broader, interfering with
municipalities' ability to weather economic downturns, administer their departments efficiently,
and respond to the needs of residents by directing funds where they are most needed. Local
leaders are chilled right now from continuing to pursue budget proposals that could trigger HB 1.
Litigation is the only remaining avenue to challenge HB 1. HB 1 is injuring municipalities
right now by the chilling budgeting discussions and creating budget uncertainty. HB 1 violates
several provisions of the constitutions on its face, and three legal entities (national legal non-
profit Public Rights Project, Florida -based community lawyers Community Justice Project, and
national firm Jenner & Block) have reviewed these facial claims to ensure their viability.
Challenging HB 1 on its face, rather than waiting for an application to challenge, will create an
opportunity for a much broader remedy: the invalidation of the law rather than the invalidation
of only one application. For these reasons, we recommend proceeding with the attached
complaint.
II. HB 1's Injury to Municipalities
HB 1 threatens municipalities' ability to make policy and governance decisions that best
reflect the needs of its constituents. HB 1 works by allowing either a state attorney or a member
of a municipal governing body (or a county sheriff pending new rules) to contest any funding
reduction to law enforcement departments in that municipality's budget. Any municipal budget
that is challenged is then reviewed by the Administration Commission, a commission made up of
the Governor and his cabinet members. The Administration Commission will then review, amend,
or modify the law enforcement items of a municipality's budget. Because of Governor DeSantis'
publicly stated position that law enforcement budgets should not be reduced in any way, it is very
likely that any reduction to a municipal law enforcement budget will be rejected. Any amendment
or modification to a municipality's budget is final.
HB 1 gives the Governor and his cabinet nearly unbridled discretion to preempt the
municipal budget. Even the smallest of budgetary adjustments could trigger budgetary revisions
from state governing officials who have little to no stake in local communities.
The imposition of this process can impact municipal budgetary discussions and decisions
in several ways. If a municipality faces natural decreases in revenue from economic downturn,
then reductions to the law enforcement budget as a result of across-the-board cuts can trigger
HB 1. The expiration of a capital expenditure or federal or state grant to law enforcement can
trigger HB 1. Simply shifting non -law enforcement programs or positions out of the law
enforcement budget can also trigger HB 1.
HB 1 looms over budgeting decisions right now, creating uncertainty about what decisions
could risk state takeover of the budget. Now is the time to challenge this law facially rather than
wait for further injury.
III. Facial Legal Claims
4
Not only do municipalities have standing to challenge HB 1, but they also have five claims
to assert in arguing that HB 1 violates the Florida Constitution. These claims have been
researched and analyzed by national and Florida non-profit organizations including Public Rights
Project and Community Justice Project, and by a private firm, Jenner & Block.
Claim One: Separation of Powers
Under the Florida Constitution, no branch of government can exercise the powers of
another branch and no branch can assign its constitutionally given powers to another branch. Fla.
Const. art. II, § 3; Smith v. State, 537 So. 2d 982, 987 (Fla. 1989). HB 1 assigns two
fundamentally legislative powers to the executive branch. First, HB 1 gives the Governor and his
cabinet the ability through the municipal budget revision process to reduce appropriations of
public funds, which is a power that belongs exclusively to the legislative branch. See, e.g., Florida
House of Representatives v. Martinez, 555 So. 2d 839, 845 (Fla. 1990). Second, HB 1 gives the
Governor and his cabinet the ability to revise municipal decisions with binding effect, even though
the ability to limit municipal power is also an exclusively legislative authority. See, e.g., Askew v.
Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 915-19 (Fla. 1978). Because HB 1 delegates two legislative
functions to the executive branch, it violates the Florida Constitution on its face.
Claim Two: Nondelegation Doctrine
To the extent the legislative branch had some authority to delegate to the executive
branch here, HB 1 nonetheless violates the nondelegation doctrine enshrined in the Florida
Constitution. This doctrine holds that any delegation of legislative functions must be accompanied
by "some minimal standards and guidelines ascertainable by reference to the enactment
establishing the program." Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 925 (Fla. 1978). The
nondelegation doctrine aims to prevent the executive "from acting through whim, showing
favoritism, or exercising unbridled discretion."' S. All, for Clean Energy v. Graham, 113 So. 3d
742, 748 (Fla. 2013). But HB 1 does not provide any such guidelines that instruct the executive
how to review municipal reductions to the law enforcement budget, so the executive can act with
unchecked discretion. The lack of standards allows the Administration Commission to make
arbitrary decisions about municipal budgets with no meaningful oversight or guiding principles,
in direct violation of the nondelegation doctrine.
3
Claim Three: Single Subject Rule
The Florida Constitution prohibits a law from addressing multiple unconnected issues and
requires a bill's title to express the subject of the legislation. Fla. Const. art. III, § 6. HB 1 violates
this rule because it combines two distinct and unrelated legal objectives into one law: Section 1
institutes a process for executive review of local budgeting decisions and the other provisions of
the law impose criminal penalties on individuals for protest -related activities. Additionally, it is
unclear how the HB 1's title "[a]n act relating to combatting public disorder" relates to the
municipal budgeting provisions.
Claim Four: Unfunded Mandate
The Florida Constitution generally prohibits the passage of any state legislation that
requires municipalities to spend funds or to take actions that require the expenditure of funds
unless the state provides or authorizes a revenue stream. Fla. Const. art. VII, § 18. HB 1 requires
a municipality to expend funds in order to maintain the previous year's law enforcement budget
or else risk the state seizing budgetary control from the municipality and line -editing the budget
without the municipality's consent or collaboration. Yet, the state has provided no revenue to
maintain such funding, nor has it authorized a new municipal funding stream. For these reasons,
HB 1 creates an unconstitutional unfunded mandate.
Claim Five; Home Rule
Like many other states across the country, Florida allows municipalities to adopt a home
rule charter which grants them broad powers to meet municipal needs. Fla. Const. art. VIII, §
2(b); Thomas v. State, 614 So. 2d 468, 472 (Fla. 1993). Among these powers include the ability
to propose and pass budgets. See City of Boca Raton v. Gidman, 440 So. 2d 1277, 1281-82 (Fla.
1983); City of Gainesville v. Bd. of Control, 81 So. 2d 514, 518 (Fla. 1955). HB 1 impedes this
function by creating a process through which the state can usurp control of the municipal budget
and unilaterally revise the budget with binding effect on the municipality. This is a clear violation
of the City's home rule authority.
IV. Conclusion and Recommendation
HB 1's injury to municipal autonomy is egregious and strategic, and it obstructs the ability
of municipalities to structure a budget that best responds to the needs and values of its residents.
Municipal autonomy and responsive local democracy are worth defending, and pursuing this
litigation would allow municipalities to defend their authority from increasing encroachment by
the state. We recommend that this Commission vote to pursue this lawsuit.
51
Southern Poverty Law Center
Bacardi Jackson
Biographies of Team Members
Proposed HB 1 Litigation
Bacardi L. Jackson, has been practicing law for over 23 years and is now the Managing
Attorney for the Miami office and Senior Supervising Attorney for Children's Rights at the
Southern Poverty Law Center. The Children's Rights Practice Group works to ensure that
vulnerable children in the deep south have equal opportunities to reach their full potential.
Before joining SPLC, from 2005-2018, Ms. Jackson was a trial attorney at Tucker Law Group
where she established and managed the firm's Florida office. She represented a wide range of
clients, including Fortune 100 companies, colleges and universities, governmental entities, and
individuals in the areas of higher education, labor and employment, commercial and complex
civil litigation, constitutional and civil rights law and catastrophic personal injury.
After completing a federal clerkship, Ms. Jackson began her legal career at the international law
firms of King & Spalding in Atlanta, Georgia and Morgan, Lewis & Bockius in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. Ms. Jackson received an A.B. in Political Science from Stanford University and a
J.D. from Yale Law School.
Always an active steward of her community, Ms. Jackson served as pro bono counsel for
several non -profits and has served on numerous local, state and national non-profit boards,
including the National Association of Minority and Women Owned Law Firms, Leadership
Florida, the Stanford Alumni Association and the Community Foundation of Broward County.
She was recognized as a Florida Super Lawyer for 2020 and 2021, honored by The Sun
Sentinel's Legacy Magazine as one of South Florida's 25 Most Influential and Prominent Black
Women in Business and Leadership and she was an inaugural recipient of the Thurgood
Marshall College Fund Distinguished Young Leader Award.
Paul Chavez
Paul R. Chavez is a Senior Supervising Attorney with the Southern Poverty Law Center's
Immigrant Justice Project, where he leads SPLC's immigrant justice work in the state of Florida.
Most recently, Mr. Chavez served as the Executive Director of Centro Legal de la Raza.
Headquartered in Oakland CA, Centro Legal is a comprehensive legal services agency that
protects and advances the rights of immigrant, low-income, and Latino communities. Under his
leadership, Centro Legal grew into one of the preeminent legal service organizations on the
West coast, including becoming the largest removal/deportation defense provider in California.
Previously, Mr. Chavez was a Senior Attorney with the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights of
the San Francisco Bay Area where he maintained an active racial and immigrant justice impact
litigation docket. Mr. Chavez has received several awards for his work, including a 2015
California Lawyer Attorney of the Year (CLAY) Award, recognizing extraordinary achievement in
Biographies of Team Members
Proposed HB 1 Litigation
Immigrant Rights Impact Litigation, and a Certificate of Special Congressional Recognition in
2018.
Mr. Chavez was a firefighter in the United States Navy prior to receiving his B.A. in Political
Science from the University of Colorado. He earned his J.D. from Berkeley Law at the University
of California.
2
Public Rights Proiect
Jonathan Miller
Biographies of Team Members
Proposed HB 1 Litigation
Jonathan Miller is the Legal Director at Public Rights Project. With over a decade of experience
as a government attorney, he has committed his career to public interest endeavors. At Public
Rights Project, Mr. Miller has defended the local autonomy of numerous cities, including most
recently Portland and Oakland in federal litigation challenging the Trump Administration's policy
and practice of deploying federal law enforcement to cities during the racial justice protests of
2020. Prior to joining Public Rights Project, Mr. Miller served as the Chief of the Public
Protection &Advocacy Bureau in the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office where he led a
150-person team engaged in investigations, litigation (both in federal and state court), and other
advocacy in the areas of civil rights, consumer protection, and workers rights. Mr. Miller
frequently has advocated before the U.S. Supreme Court on civil rights matters including
affirmative action, reproductive rights, and marriage equality.
In addition to his legal practice, Mr. Miller has served as a Lecturer in Law at Harvard Law
School and an instructor at several other law schools. He graduated from Dartmouth College
and Columbia Law School.
LiJia Gong
LiJia Gong is Counsel at Public Rights Project where she combines significant litigation
experience with political strategy to represent cities in public -facing litigation defending workers'
rights and local autonomy. Prior to joining PRP, Ms. Gong worked as a senior legal analyst to
Senator Elizabeth Warren in her 2018 re-election campaign. Ms. Gong also litigated at two
national law firms, Frankfurt Kurnit, Klein & Selz and Davis Polk & Wardwell, where she
represented clients in nearly all phases of litigation in cases before state and federal courts..
Ms. Gong earned her J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center and her B.S.F.S. from
Georgetown University.
Marissa Roy
Marissa Roy is a Staff Attorney for Public Rights Project and Legal Team Lead for the Local
Solutions Support Center. Ms. Roy has spent her career working with local governments to
engage in high -impact litigation. As a Deputy City Attorney for the City of Los Angeles and
outside counsel for County of Los Angeles, Ms. Roy represented the municipal perspective in
several challenges to the Trump Administration's immigration policies, from the federal district
court all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. In these cases, Ms. Roy protected local autonomy
from federal infringement.
Ms. Roy earned her J.D. from Yale Law School as well as her Master's in Public Diplomacy and
B.A. in Philosophy, Politics, and Law from the University of Southern California.
3
Community Justice Project
Berbeth Foster
Biographies of Team Members
Proposed HB 1 Litigation
Berbeth Foster is the Senior Staff Attorney at Community Justice Project. Ms. Foster has a
decade of experience litigating and defending low-income populations in consumer rights
matters including mortgage foreclosure, debt collection, fraud, and Chapter 13 bankruptcy. In
her position at legal aid, she litigated and negotiated over half a million dollars in debt relief for
her clients. Ms. Foster left her position as Lead Consumer Litigation Counsel at Legal Aid to
work on impact litigation at Community Justice Project. Currently, she focuses her time
representing a vast array of grassroots organizations fighting for racial and economic justice.
She works with various statewide and national coalitions advocating for housing as a human
right, reimagining public safety, and climate justice.
Berbeth graduated from the University of Miami School of Law and from Florida International
University where she earned her B.A. and M.A.
Miriam Haskell
Miriam Haskell is a Senior Attorney and Director of Litigation at Community Justice Project. Ms.
Haskell has dedicated her legal career to centering individuals and communities in their fights
for justice. Prior to her role at Community Justice Project, she worked at the Southern Poverty
Law Center, where she focused on class-action litigation against juvenile and adult prisons. In
addition, Ms. Haskell worked for Legal Services of Greater Miami, where she represented
people trying to access public benefits and school services for students with disabilities.
Ms. Haskell attended Barnard College and the University of North Carolina School of Law.
Ie!
Jenner & Block
Lindsay Harrison
Biographies of Team Members
Proposed HB 1 Litigation
Lindsay Harrison is a litigator and partner in Jenner & Block's Appellate and Supreme Court and
Complex Commercial Litigation Practices. Ms. Harrison's practice spans a diverse range of
matters and clients. Many of her matters involve high -stakes legal challenges under the
Administrative Procedure Act, including recent victories challenging the rescission of the
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program and challenging an Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) directive that limits the participation of scientists from academia and
nonpartisan nonprofit organizations on federal science advisory committees. Ms. Harrison also
leads the firm's Hospitality and Gaming Practice, representing hotel management companies in
disputes with owners, partners and consumer class actions. Ms. Harrison has a substantial pro
bono practice, which has included her successful argument before the U.S. Supreme Court on
behalf of an asylum -seeker and the ongoing representation of a death row inmate in Georgia.
Ms. Harrison received a B.A. from the University of Southern California and a J.D. from Harvard
Law School. After graduating from law school, Ms. Harrison clerked for Judge Gold in the
Southern District of Florida and for Judge Barkett on the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
John Flynn
John Flynn is co-chair of Jenner & Block's Communications, Internet, and Technology Practice
and a partner in its Washington, D.C. office. He represents telecom, media, and technology
companies in a wide variety of matters, including merger proceedings and other government
investigations, technology -related litigation, internet and wireless regulatory issues, and
telecommunications transactions. In achieving results for clients, Mr. Flynn draws on more than
25 years of communications and technology experience spanning government, private practice,
and the private sector.
Mr. Flynn received his J.D., magna cum laude, from the Georgetown University Law Center in
1995, where he served as the Senior Notes and Comments Editor of The Georgetown Law
Journal. He received his MA in International Policy Studies and A.B. in Political Science, with
distinction, from Stanford University. Mr. Flynn clerked for the Hon. Edward R. Becker of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in 1995 and Justices Byron R. White and John Paul
Stevens on the U.S. Supreme Court in 1996-97.
Carter Smith
Carter Smith is an associate in Jenner & Block's Litigation and Communications, Internet and
Technology practice groups. Mr. Smith received his JD from the University of Virginia School
Law in 2020. During law school, Mr. Smith was a research assistant to professors Richard
Schragger and Cale Jaffe, and he also worked with the Environmental and Regulatory Law
0
Biographies of Team Members
Proposed HB 1 Litigation
Clinic, assisting a large regional non-profit with state and federal administrative law issues. Mr.
Smith received his BA from Seattle University in 2014, where he studied economics and
philosophy, and was inducted into the Omicron Delta Epsilon economics honors society. Mr.
Smith is admitted to practice law in Florida and the District of Columbia.
[y
Academic Experts
Professor Nestor Davidson
Biographies of Team Members
Proposed HB 1 Litigation
Professor Nestor Davidson joined the faculty of Fordham University School of Law in 2011 and
was named the Albert A. Walsh Professor of Real Estate, Land Use and Property Law in 2017.
Professor Davidson is an expert in property, urban law, and affordable housing law and policy,
and is the co-author of the casebook Property Law: Rules, Policies and Practices (7th ed.
2017). Professor Davidson founded and serves as the faculty director of the law school's Urban
Law Center and previously served as Associate Dean for Academic Affairs. Professor Davidson
also serves as a member of the legal team at Local Solutions Support Center.
Professor Davidson practiced with the firm of Latham and Watkins, focusing on commercial real
estate and affordable housing, and served as Special Counsel and Principal Deputy General
Counsel at the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Professor Davidson
earned his A.B. from Harvard College and his J.D. from Columbia Law School. After law school,
he clerked for Judge David S. Tatel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit and Justice David H. Souter of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Professor Rick Su
Rick Su is a Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina School of Law, where he
teaches and writes in the areas of local government law, immigration, and federalism. His
research focuses on the intersection between cities and immigration. His work has appeared in
the Columbia Law Review, the William & Mary Law Review, the University of Pennsylvania
Journal of Constitutional Law, and the North Carolina Law Review. Professor Su also serves on
the Law Professor Panel for the Local Solutions Support Center.
Su received his B.A. from Dartmouth College and his J.D. from Harvard Law School. After
graduating from law school, he clerked for The Honorable Stephen Reinhardt on the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals and worked in the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development. Prior to joining the Carolina Law faculty in 2019, Su taught at the University at
Buffalo School of Law, where he won the faculty teaching award in 2009 and 2015.
7
Resolution No.
A Resolution of the City Commission of the City of Tamarac,
Florida, authorizing Public Rights Project, a project of the
Tides Center, Community Justice Project, and Southern
Poverty Law Center to file a lawsuit on behalf of the City of
Tamarac, Florida, that facially challenges Section 1 of CS/HB 1
(2021); and providing an immediate effective date.
WHEREAS, the City of Tamarac exercises control over its annual budget as a means to
respond to the diverse needs, interests, and values of the community it represents; and
WHEREAS, the City is currently considering and structuring its FY 2022 budget; and
WHEREAS, Section 1 of CS/HB 1 creates a state executive review process that is
triggered when a City Commissioner or the State Attorney for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit
objects to a funding reduction to the operating budget of the City's law enforcement agency; and
WHEREAS, CS/HB 1 delegates this process to the Administration Commission (made
up of the Governor and Cabinet), which has the power to amend or modify the budget as to each
separate item within the operating budget of the City's law enforcement agency with no limiting
principles on the Administration Commission's discretion; and
WHEREAS, Public Rights Project, Community Justice Project and Southern Poverty
Law Center have prepared a draft complaint for consideration by the City Commission; and
WHEREAS, the City Commission has reviewed the draft complaint and has weighed the
considerations, including the protection of the City of Tamarac's budgeting authority and
municipal autonomy, and desires to move forward with the litigation.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE CITY COMMISSION OF THE CITY
OF TAMARAC, FLORIDA:
Page 1 of 2
Section 1. The City Commission hereby states that it is suffering a current injury because
its FY 2022 budget considerations are impacted by HB l; and
Section 2. The City Commission hereby authorizes Public Rights Project, Community
Justice Project, and Southern Poverty Law Center to file a lawsuit bringing a facial challenge to
Section 1 of CS/HB 1 on behalf of the City as a Plaintiff, seeking declaratory, injunctive, and
other appropriate relief, as set forth in the draft complaint shared with and reviewed by the City
Commission. Pursuant to that authorization, Public Rights Project, Community Justice Project,
and Southern Poverty Law Center have the authority to add allegations to the complaint
regarding the impact of CS/HB 1 on the City of Tamarac as well as additional municipal
plaintiffs to the lawsuit.
Section 3. This resolution shall take effect immediately upon adoption.
PASSED AND ADOPTED this _th day of , 2021.
ATTEST:
Michelle Gomez, Mayor
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND
LEGALITY:
Jennifer Johnson, City Clerk John R. Herin, Jr., City Attorney
Page 2 of 2
CITY OF MIRAMAR
PROPOSED CITY COMMISSION AGENDA ITEM
Meeting Date: August 18, 2021
Presenter's Name and Title: Burnadette Norris Weeks, Esq., City Attorney
Prepared By: Michelle Austin Parries, Esq., City Attorney
Temp. Reso. Number: 7472
Item Description: Temp. Reso. #R7472 authorizing the Public Rights Project, a
project of the Tides Center, Community Justice Project, and Southern Poverty Law Center
to file a lawsuit on behalf of the City of Miramar, Florida, that facially challenges Section
1 of CS/HB 1 (2021). (Sponsored by Mayor Wayne M. Messam) (City Attorney
Burnadette Norris -Weeks)
Consent ❑ Resolution ® Ordinance ❑ Quasi -Judicial ❑ Public Hearing ❑
Instructions for the Office of the City Clerk: None
Public Notice — As required by the Sec. _ of the City Code and/or Sec. , Florida Statutes, public notice for this item was
provided as follows: on in a ad in the ; by the posting the property on
and/or by sending mailed notice to property owners within feet of the property on
(fill in all that apply)
Special Voting Requirement — As required by Sec. , of the City Code and/or Sec. , Florida Statutes, approval of this item
requires a (unanimous, 4/5ths etc.) vote by the City Commission.
Fiscal Impact:
REMARKS: None
Yes ® No ❑
Content:
• Agenda Item Memo from the City Manager to City Commission
• Resolution TR7472
Rev. 4/7/21
CITY OF MIRAMAR
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM
TO: Mayor, Vice Mayor, & City Commissioners
FROM: Vernon E. Hargray, City Manager
BY: Burnadette Norris Weeks, Esq., City Attorney
DATE: April 12, 2018
RE: Temp. Reso. No. 7472, authorizing the Public Rights Project, a project of
the Tides Center, Community Justice Project, and Southern Poverty Law
Center to file a lawsuit against the Florida Governor and Florida Attorney
General on behalf of the City of Miramar, Florida, that facially challenges
Section 1 of CS/HB 1(2021)
RECOMMENDATION: The City Manager recommends approval of Temp. Reso.
#R7472, authorizing the Public Rights Project, a project of the Tides Center, Community
Justice Project, and Southern Poverty Law Center to file a lawsuit on behalf of the City of
Miramar, Florida, that facially challenges Section 1 of CS/HB 1 (2021).
ISSUE: City commission approval is required to authorize the City of Miramar to file
a lawsuit challenging Section 1 of CS/H131 (2021).
BACKGROUND: Following the nationwide and Florida racial justice protests of the
Summer of 2020, the Florida Governor, Ron DeSantis, signed into law CS/HB1, which,
among other things, attempts to discourage protests by permitting any person who
participates in a peaceful protest that turns violent (even if such violence occurs without
the involvement of the protestor) to be arrested and charged with a third-degree felony.
If a city's budget reduces the operating budget of the city's law enforcement agency, HB
1 permits the state attorney for the judicial circuit in which a city is located or any member
of the city's governing body to file an appeal by petition to the Administration Commission,
a body that is comprised of the Governor and his cabinet. The Administration
Commission will review the petition through an expedited process that gives cities only
five (5) days to file a reply. Following its review, the Administration Commission can
approve, amend, or modify the city's challenged budget. HB 1 does not provide cities with
the ability to appeal the decision to a court of competent jurisdiction.
The City of Miramar has approved a Voluntary Retirement Incentive Program ("VRIP").
Some police officers have taken advantage of the VRIP, thereby reducing the payroll line
item from the Police Department Budget for 2022. Accordingly, under HB1, the City of
Miramar may be subject to an appeal of its budget decision. Public Rights Project,
Community Justice Project, and Southern Poverty Law Center are willing to file a lawsuit
on behalf of the City of Miramar, Florida, that facially challenges Section 1 of CS/HB 1
(2021) on various legal grounds. The lawsuit will be at no cost or liability to the City. The
City of Gainesville has already approved being a plaintiff in the lawsuit; and it is expected
that other cities may also participate in the lawsuit.
Page 2 of 2
Temp. Reso. No. 7472
8/10/21
8/10/21
CITY OF MIRAMAR
MIRAMAR, FLORIDA
Ia** ]X M[o7`9�I0
A RESOLUTION OF THE CITY COMMISSION OF THE CITY
OF MIRAMAR, FLORIDA, AUTHORIZING THE PUBLIC
RIGHTS PROJECT, A PROJECT OF THE TIDES CENTER,
COMMUNITY JUSTICE PROJECT, AND SOUTHERN
POVERTY LAW CENTER TO FILE A LAWSUIT ON
BEHALF OF THE CITY OF MIRAMAR, FLORIDA, THAT
FACIALLY CHALLENGES SECTION 1 OF CS/HB 1 (2021);
AND PROVIDING FOR AN EFFECTIVE DATE.
WHEREAS, the City of Miramar exercises control over its annual budget as a
means to respond to the diverse needs, interests, and values of the community it
represents; and
and
WHEREAS, the City is currently considering and structuring its FY 2022 Budget;
WHEREAS, the City has instituted a city-wide Voluntary Retirement Incentive
Program ("VRIP"), that, among other things, will institute a two-year freeze on the
positions of any police officer who opts to retire early under the VRIP; and
WHEREAS, this city-wide voluntary retirement program will have the effect of
reducing the salary line item of the City's law enforcement budget; and
WHEREAS, Section 1 of CS/HB 1 creates a State executive review process that
is triggered when a City Commissioner or the State Attorney in the applicable Judicial
Circuit objects to a funding reduction to the operating budget of the City's law enforcement
agency; and
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Temp. Reso. No. 7472
8/10/21
8/10/21
WHEREAS, CS/HB 1 delegates this process to the Administration Commission
comprised of the Governor and Cabinet, which has the power to amend or modify the
budget as to each separate item within the operating budget of the City's law enforcement
agency with no limiting principles on the Administration Commission's discretion; and
WHEREAS, Public Rights Project, Community Justice Project and Southern
Poverty Law Center have prepared a draft complaint for consideration by the City
Commission; and
WHEREAS, the City Commission has reviewed the draft complaint and has
weighed the considerations, including the protection of the City of Miramar's budgeting
authority and municipal autonomy, and desires to move forward as a participant in the
litigation.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE CITY COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF
MIRAMAR, FLORIDA:
Section 1. The City Commission hereby states that it is suffering a current injury
because its FY 2022 budget considerations are impacted by HB 1; and
Section 2. The City Commission hereby authorizes Public Rights Project,
Community Justice Project, and the Southern Poverty Law Center to file a lawsuit bringing
a facial challenge to Section 1 of CS/HB 1 on behalf of the City as a Plaintiff, seeking
declaratory, injunctive, and other appropriate relief, as set forth in the draft complaint
shared with and reviewed by the members of the City Commission.
Reso. No. 2
Temp. Reso. No. 7472
8/10/21
8/10/21
Section 3. This resolution shall take effect immediately upon adoption.
PASSED AND ADOPTED this day of
Mayor, Wayne M. Messam
Vice Mayor, Yvette Colbourne
ATTEST:
City Clerk, Denise A. Gibbs
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have approved
this RESOLUTION as to form:
City Attorney
Austin Pamies Norris Weeks Powell, PLLC
Requested by Administration Voted
Commissioner Winston F. Barnes
Commissioner Maxwell B. Chambers
Vice Mayor Yvette Colbourne
Commissioner Alexandra P. Davis
Mayor Wayne M. Messam
Reso. No. 3
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,
IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
CITY OF GAINESVILLE, FLORIDA,
Plaints,
► -f
RON DESANTIS, in his official capacity as
Governor of the State of Florida; and
ASHLEY MOODY, in her official capacity as
Attorney General of the State of Florida,
Defendants.
CASE NO.
COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs, the City of Gainesville, , and bring this action for declaratory
and injunctive relief against Defendants Ron DeSantis, in his official capacity as Governor of the
State of Florida, and Ashley Moody, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the State of
Florida, and state as follows:
INTRODUCTION
1. Municipalities are the government closest to the people. Municipal governments
provide the day-to-day services that most Floridians rely on, from public transportation to parks
and libraries to safety and emergency services. Municipalities have a responsibility to allocate
these services in the way that best responds to the needs of the local community, and to do that,
they need authority to be able to craft budgets that reflect community values. This budget -making
authority lies at the heart of a municipality's legislative powers.
2. Throughout Florida, municipalities have been engaging in meaningful dialogue
with residents about investing in public safety strategies that emphasize social services outside of
law enforcement, after thousands of Floridians called on municipalities to prioritize racial justice.
This dialogue has spurred municipal budget reform proposals that reimagine public safety as
responsive and reflective of community needs and values.
3. Governor Ron DeSantis has commandeered this local legislative process through
unconstitutional legislation: the Combating Violence, Disorder, and Looting, and Law
Enforcement Protection Act, also known as HB 1. HB 1 allows the Governor and his cabinet to
wield state-wide executive power to take control of a local budget that reduces law -enforcement
spending, thereby reversing the local legislative process and directing local tax dollars with no
1
guiding standards, no limitations from the state legislature, and no accountability to the impacted
local communities.
4. In just the few months since its enactment, HB 1 has impacted municipal budgeting
throughout Florida. Municipalities have little ability to predict which decisions could be overruled
under HB 1's state takeover provisions, making it unworkable to commit funds to certain services
when the state could retroactively reverse that decision. Municipalities are deterred from
considering the budgeting reforms that their residents are calling for because doing so could cost
them control over their budget and, in turn, hamper their ability to function. Fiscally conservative
municipalities are discouraged from pursuing cost -saving measures across all municipal
departments. In essence, municipalities have been chilled from structuring their budgets to serve
the best interests and needs of their communities.
5. HB 1 violates the Florida Constitution on several grounds:
a. Separation of Powers: The state legislature does not have the authority to
convey local budget oversight to the state executive branch under the Florida Constitution's
separation of powers provisions, Fla. Const. art. II, § 3;
b. Nondele ag tion: The legislature does not have the authority to delegate
unlimited and unguided discretion to the executive pursuant to the nondelegation doctrine;
C. Single -Subject Rule: HB 1 does not abide by the Florida Constitution's
single subject rule because only its first section relates to municipal budgeting while its
subsequent sections pertain to individual speech activities, Fla. Const. art. I11, § 6;
d. Unfunded Mandate: However it is applied, HB 1 creates an unfunded
mandate, forcing municipalities to make expenditures at the command of the state without
2
any financial support and in violation of the Florida Constitution, Fla. Const. art. VII, § 18;
and
e. Home Rule: HB 1 disregards the protection of internal municipal
governance under home rule that voters have time and time again guaranteed to
municipalities in Florida, Fla. Const. art. VIII, § 2.
6. These infirmities require a permanent injunction of HB 1's municipal budgeting
provisions. Municipalities need control and certainty over their budget in order to serve the needs
of their residents with a budget that reflects their communities' priorities and values.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
7. This is an action seeking declaratory relief, which this Court has jurisdiction to
grant pursuant to Chapter 86 of the Florida Statutes, and injunctive relief, which this Court has
jurisdiction to grant pursuant to Section 26.012 of the Florida Statutes. See Fla. Stat. §§ 26.012,
86.011, 86.021.
8. The City of Gainesville is a proper plaintiff to challenge the constitutionality of HB
1 because this law will require the City to expend public funds on law enforcement that otherwise
would have been allocated to other municipal services and because this law has injected substantial
uncertainty into the City's overall budgeting process.
9. Venue is proper in Leon County because the Defendants are all located, or have
their principal headquarters, in Leon County Florida. See Fla. Stat. § 47.011.
THE PARTIES
10. The City of Gainesville is a municipality established in 1927 and vested with "all
governmental, corporate, and proprietary powers" that enable it to perform its municipal functions,
which include, among others, "expend[ing] the money of the City for all lawful purposes,"
3
"maintain[ing] a department or division of police," and "do[ing] all things whatsoever necessary
or expedient for promoting or maintaining the general welfare ... peace, [and] government ... of
the city or its inhabitants." Fla. Ch. 90-394, art. 1 § 101 (1990); Fla. Ch. 12760, § 7(e), (x)-(y)
(1927).
11. Defendant Ron DeSantis currently serves as the Governor of the State of Florida.
He is sued in his official capacity. He is the Florida constitutional officer charged with "tak[ing]
care that the laws [are] faithfully executed." Fla. Const. art. IV, § l (a). Governor DeSantis is
responsible for the enforcement of HB 1 and an appropriate defendant in this action.
12. Defendant Ashley Moody currently serves as the Attorney General of the State of
Florida. She is sued in her official capacity. She serves as Florida's chief legal officer. Fla. Const.
art. W, § 4(b). Attorney General Moody is responsible for the enforcement of HB 1 and an
appropriate defendant in this action.
FACTS
I. The Florida Constitution Establishes a Distinct and Robust Tripartite
System of State Government and Floridians' Right to Local Self -Governance.
13. From the very first words of the U.S. Constitution, "We the People," America
stands as a system rooted in self-government. A key tenet of the American constitutional tradition
is the recognition that the powers imbued in government derive solely from the people.'
1 See U.S. Const. preamble ("We the people of the United States... do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America."); see also The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776) ("Governments are instituted
among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed[.]"); Mont. Const. art. II, pt. II, § 1 ("All
political power is vested in and derived from the people."); Penn. Const. art. I, § 2 ("All power is inherent in the
people, and all free governments are founded on their authority and instituted for their peace, safety and
happiness."); Tex. Const. art. I, § 2 ("All political power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are
founded on their authority, and instituted for their benefit."); Virg. Const. art. I, § 2 ("[A]11 power is vested in, and
consequently derived from, the people, that magistrates are their trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to
them.")
m
14. This American constitutional tradition of self-government is protected by a system
of checks and balances.2 Constitutional checks and balances not only guard the liberties of the
governed against abuse by their government, but also reserve ample power to the people so that
the people may govern themselves and their own affairs.3
15. One of the most vital checks and balances is the separation of powers among
different branches and different levels of government.' The U.S. and vast majority of state
constitutions incorporate both horizontal separation of powers principles by establishing tripartite
systems of governments —consisting of a legislative, executive, and judicial branch —and vertical
separation of powers principles by reserving power to the people and their local governments
through home rule.6
16. Vertical separation of powers provides a critical protection of democracy because
municipal leadership is based in the local community, rather than a faraway state capital. At the
'See Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 151-52 (Hafner, Thomas Nugent trans, 1949) ("When the
legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no
liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute
them in a tyrannical manner."); John Locke, Two Treatise of Government 193 (Thomas I. Cook ed., Hafner
Publishing Co. 1947) ("And when the people have said, we will submit to rules and be governed by laws made by
such men, and in such forms, nobody else can say other men shall make laws for them; nor can the people be bound
by any laws but such as are enacted by those whom they have chosen and authorized to make laws for them.").
3 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) ("Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches
of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy
balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from
either front."); see also Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. Chi, L.
Rev, 123, 131-32 (1994) ("[I]t is important to realize that the core value of multiple repositories of power that the
citizens are sovereign and their delegated power must be fractured among various governmental actors —is central as
well to both judicial review and federalism .... the structure of federalism was intended to ensure that the citizens had
multiple governmental repositories, at varying levels of locality, into which to delegate powers.").
'See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation, Inc. v.
Lewellen, 952 S.W. 2d 454 (Tex. 1997).
'INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) ("[T]he Framers saw fit to divide and balance the powers of Government so
that each branch would be checked by the others. Virtually every part of our constitutional system bears the mark of
this judgement."); see also Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of
Powers Ideals in the State, 52 Van. L. Rev. 1167, 1187-1202 (1999) (cataloguing various separation of powers
provisions in state constitutions).
6 See U.S. Const. amend. X; Lynn A. Baker & Daniel Rodriguez, Constitutional Home Rule and Judicial Scrutiny,
86 Denv. L. Rev. 1337, Appendix (2009) (listing various state constitutional home rule provisions).
5
local level, residents have easier access to their representatives —who often represent fewer
constituents than at the state level —which in turn allows municipalities to craft policy that directly
responds to community needs and more closely reflects community values.'
17. The Florida Constitution of 1968 and its subsequent amendments observe the
American constitutional tradition with especially robust horizontal separation of powers
principles, among the strictest and strongest of all state constitutions.9
18. The people of Florida additionally amended the Florida Constitution in 1968 to
guarantee the vertical separation of powers principle of local self-government by granting
municipalities the right to home rule.'0
19. The amended Article VIII, § 2(b) of the Florida Constitution establishes that
"municipalities shall have governmental, corporate and proprietary powers to enable them to
conduct municipal government, perform municipal functions and render municipal services, and
may exercise power for municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law." This
amendment ensured that home rule, a long-standing tradition in Florida since the earliest days of
its history as a Spanish colony, would remain enshrined in the fabric of Florida's democracy. t 1
20. The Florida Legislature and state courts have reaffirmed the principle of home rule
since the people's mandate. When the home rule amendment was initially interpreted narrowly,
See generally Paul A. Diller, Why Do Cities Innovate in Public Health? Implications of Scale and Structure, 91
Wash. U. L. Rev. 1219 (2014).
'See, e.g., Fla. Const. art. I, § 1 ("All political power is inherent in the people."); Fla. Const. art. II, § 3 ("The
powers of the state government shall be divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person
belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly
provided herein.").
'See Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the
State, 52 Van. L. Rev. 1167, 1195 (1999).
to See Fla. Const. art. VIII.
11 Florida House of Representatives, The History and Status of Local Government Powers in Florida 1-2 (July 31,
1972).
C
the Florida Legislature enacted the Municipal Home Rules Power Act (MHRPA) (Ch. 166 of the
Florida Statutes) to underline the importance of local control under the new constitutional
amendment.12 The Florida Supreme Court has since emphasized: "The clear purpose of the
[amendment] was to give the municipalities inherent power to meet municipal needs.... The
legislature's retained power is now one of limitation rather than one of grace." Lake Worth Utilities
Auth. v. City of Lake Worth, 468 So. 2d 215, 217 (Fla. 1985).
21. Insofar as the state has retained power to influence municipal policy, it may only
do so through valid exertion of legislative power. See Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d
913, 915-19 (Fla. 1978). In order to keep the legislature accountable to the communities they
represent, this core legislative power cannot be delegated to another branch of state government.
22. Florida voters have also expanded the protections of local self -governance. When
the state legislature began encroaching on local governments' autonomy by requiring them to make
expenditures without providing a revenue stream, Floridians overwhelmingly voted to adopt a new
constitutional amendment in 1990 preventing the state legislature from imposing unfunded
mandates on local governments.13
23. Article VII, § 18 of the Florida Constitution provides that "no county or
municipality shall be bound by any general law requiring such county or municipality to spend
funds or to take an action requiring the expenditure of funds" subject to certain limitations.
24. Florida's horizontal and vertical separation of powers principles —its three -branch
system of state government and its home rule guarantee —work together to reinforce checks and
12 J. James R. Wolf and Harah Harley Bolinder, The Effectiveness of Home Rule: A Preemption and Conflict
Analysis, 83 Fla. B.J. No.6 (2009).
" Fl. Dep't of State, Fl. General Election Results (Nov. 6, 1990), https://results.elections.myflorida.com/
? ElectionDate= l 1 /6/ 1990&DATAMODE=.
7
balances, empower the people of Florida to govern themselves, and protect this liberty from
diminution by any means other than a valid exercise of legislative power.
Charter of the City of Gainesville
25. The City of Gainesville is a home rule city as defined under Article VIII, Section
2, of the Florida Constitution. The Legislature granted the City home rule status, as defined under
the Florida home rule constitutional amendment, in 1990 via statute 14:
"The City of Gainesville, created by chapter 12760, Laws of Florida, 1927, as
amended, shall continue and is vested with all governmental, corporate, and
proprietary powers to enable it to conduct municipal government, perform
municipal functions, render municipal services, and exercise any power for
municipal purposes, except as otherwise provided by law.""
The statute continued by explicitly providing that "the powers of the city shall be construed
liberally in favor of the city, limited only by the State Constitution, general law, and specific
limitations contained in this act."16
26. Among the powers guaranteed to Gainesville are the powers to "raise taxes"17; ,to
expend the money of the City for all lawful purposes"19; "to exercise full police powers, and
establish and maintain a department or division of police" 19; and "to do all things whatsoever
necessary or expedient for promoting or maintaining the general welfare, comfort, education,
morals, peace, government, health, trade, commerce or industries of the city or its inhabitants".20
1a 1990 Fla. Laws, ch. 90- 394, at 47 .
15 1990 Fla. Laws, ch. 12760, art. 1.01.
16 1990 F1a.Laws, ch. 12760, art. 1.03. .
17 1990 Fla. Laws, ch. 12760 at 1388.
11 1990 Fla. Laws, ch. 12760 at 1389.
19 1990 Fla. Laws, ch. 12760 at 1394.
20 1990 Fla. Laws, ch. 12760 at 1394.
n.
27. The Charter of the City of Gainesville adopts home rule wholesale.21 It also
provides that among the enumerated powers of the City are the formulation and approval of an
annual budget22 and control over the Gainesville Police Department.23
II. Florida Municipalities Are Best Positioned to Adopt Budgets that Reflect
Their Residents' Needs, Values, and Priorities.
28. Municipal budgets reflect the priorities of the community. Municipalities are
expected to provide a wide array of services to residents and must make difficult decisions about
how to allocate finite resources to best serve the needs of the community. In some communities,
constituents may advocate for a more fiscally conservative budget, while in others, constituents
may push for an increase in certain services that necessitate a reallocation of funding. Municipal
budgeting enables and celebrates these differences allowing residents to have a voice in their
communities.
29. Floridians rely on their municipal governments to provide and maintain a wide
array of public services, such as parks, recreation centers, libraries, animal control, water,
transportation, and public safety.
30. In Florida, however, municipal revenue streams are limited. The Florida
Constitution caps municipal property taxes at $10 per $1,000 valuation, Fla. Const. Art. VII, §
9(b), so this funding stream generally accounts for less than half of the revenue that Florida
municipalities generate.24 Additionally, municipalities rely on a combination of proprietary and
regulatory fees along with grants from the state and federal governments or other external entities.
21 Gainesville, Fla., Ordinances, art. 1, § 1.01 (2021).
22 Gainesville, Fla., Ordinances, ch. 3, art. 3, § 3.02 (2021).
23 Gainesville, Fla., Ordinances, ch. 21, art. 1 (2021).
24 Florida League of Cities, 2019 State of Cities (2019), http://www.floridaleagueofcities.com/does/default-
source/default-document-library/2019-state-o f-the-cities. pdf? sfvrsn=c405 dad5_6.
E
31. These streams of revenue are naturally variable. Municipal tax and fee revenue
fluctuate every year based on several factors, including economic conditions and individual
activity. When there are natural decreases in local revenues, municipalities have to make budget
cuts across the board in order to achieve a balanced budget. During the 2010 recession, for
example, several municipalities in Florida had to make budget reductions that impacted law
enforcement:
a. In 2010, tax revenues plummeted in Panama City. In order to balance the
books, the city unfunded all vacant positions. Of 31 positions, 11 cuts came from the police
department, including sworn officers and civilian positions."
b. The 2011-12 budget approved by the Gainesville City Commission cut
Gainesville Police Department's budget by $946,000, saving 3.2% of the $29.6 general
fund. These funding reductions resulted in the elimination of several command staff
positions in the department.26
C. In Jacksonville, between the fiscal years of 2010 and 2013, 147 police
officer positions were eliminated due to budget cuts, including the entire mounted police
force.27
32. Some decreases in local revenue may arise when an intergovernmental or external
grant is time -limited and non-renewable. As the grant period ends, a municipality must decide how
to maintain that funding stream or allow the reduction. For example, in 2012, the City of
Gainesville was one of only two municipalities to receive a grant from the Center for Children's
" Katie Landeck, Chief Panama City Police Department `strained', Panama City News Herald (Jan. 7, 2017),
https ://www.newsherald. com/news/20170107/chief-panama-city-police-department-strained.
26 Cindy Swirko, Budget Cuts Hit GPD Command Staff Hard, The Gainesville Sun (Sept. 17, 2010),
https://www. gainesviHe. com/article/LK/20100917/news/604164102/GS/.
27 David Bauerlein, 71 of 147 police cuts not linked to Mayor Brown, analyses find, The Florida Times -Union (May
14, 2015), https://www.jacksonville.com/article/20150514/NEWS/801245291.
10
Law and Policy to reduce the arrest rates of youth of color. The grant and associated revenue
stream expired after two years, so Gainesville allocated its own municipal funds toward the
Disproportionate Minority Contact Initiative. Had Gainesville not allocated that continued revenue
stream, the police department budget would have been reduced due to the expiration of the grant.
33. Other times, municipalities may reorganize departments and shift funding
structures to promote economic efficiency. For example, in 1990, the Live Oak City Council voted
to turn the city's lava enforcement role over to the Suwannee County Sheriffs Office due to budget
constraints. Likewise, Mexico Beach's former police department was dissolved in October 2019
in favor of having the Bay County Sheriffs Office take over. City officials reported the switch
saved Mexico Beach money that helped other service areas.28
34. In some cases, municipalities have used their budget authority to dismantle parts of
police departments that were found to be engaging in malfeasance and misappropriation. In 1987,
the City of West Pahn Beach disbanded its ten -member tactical team after members of the city's
Haitian community sued the city accusing officers of violating their constitutional rights,
conducting unreasonable strip searches, using slurs, and physically abusing them. The city settled
the lawsuit for $75'000.21 And in 1992, the City of Largo disbanded their special investigations
unit after evidence surfaced of detectives misusing funds and police vehicles. Money allocated for
the special unit moved back into the city's general fund.30
35. Municipalities face difficult budgetary decisions every year, and the current fiscal
year is no different. As a result of the economic downturn caused by the COVID-19 pandemic,
28 Blake Brannon, Officials Zook back at transition from Mexico Beach Police Department to Bay County Sheriff's
Office, WJHG News Channel 7 (Nov. 2, 2020).https://www.wjhg.com/2020/11/03/officials-look-back-at-transition-
from-mexico-beach-police-department-to-bay-county-sheriffs-office/.
29 Larry Aydlette, West Palm May Pay $75, 000 to End Lawsuit, The Palm Beach Post (Dec. 30, 1987),
https://www.newspapers. com/image/ 129627445/.
"Police Unit Disbanded, St. Petersburg Times (Apr. 26, 1992), https://www.newspapers.com/image/323640260/.
11
many cities have been forced to reduce their budgets. The City of Miami was forced to cut 66
sworn police officer positions, along with over a dozen firefighters, due to a projected $30 million
shortfall.31
36. In crafting a budget that balances finite resources among a broad array of
commitments, municipalities often seek input and collaboration from the community. Municipal
budgeting discussions are generally open to the public where comment is invited. In Gainesville,
for example, the City Manager proposes a first version of the budget at a public City Commission
meeting. Over a period of several months, there are multiple opportunities for public comment and
discussion as City Commissioners consider the budget in depth. What is eventually produced
reflects public comments and community needs over the next fiscal year within the limits of the
city's revenue.
37. Because developing a municipal budget requires a nuanced understanding of the
municipality's capacity as well as residents' needs and values, doing so is considered a core
application of legislative power —one properly exercised by the municipality itself through its
constitutional home rule guarantee. Under no circumstances would a municipal budget crafted and
promulgated by the state executive branch be valid under the Florida Constitution's separation of
powers provisions.
M. Floridians Have Called on Their Local Governments to Reimagine Public
Safety Through Meaningful Changes to Municipal Budgeting.
38. As municipal spending on law enforcement has far outpaced spending on public
health and social services, residents have been engaging with their municipal governments to
rebalance spending to support social services separate from law enforcement.
31 Joey Flechas, Miami's COVID Budget Passes with Police Layoffs, Transformed NET and Canceled Events,
Miami Herald (Sept. 25, 2020), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/
article245995330.html.
12
39. Law enforcement has grown to account for the lion's share of municipal spending.
From 1977 to 2017, state and local spending on law enforcement nearly tripled from $42 billion
to $115 billion,32 with municipalities contributing 86% of the funding.33 Policing is now the single
largest municipal expenditure in 35 of the country's 50 largest cities.34
40. Municipal spending in Florida is no different. In the three largest cities in Florida,
Jacksonville, Miami, and Tampa, police spending accounts for 33% to 40% of the municipal
budget.35 In Gainesville, police spending amounts to over one quarter of the city's general fund.36
41. As spending on law enforcement has grown, so has the scope of law enforcement
activity. Only around 1 % of 911 calls37 and less than 5% of police arrests 38 relate to serious violent
crime. Instead, police officers spend the biggest share of their time responding to non -emergency
calls,39 including by treating overdoses, responding to mental health crises, and addressing
homelessness.40
32 Criminal Justice Expenditures: Police, Corrections, and Courts, Urban Inst., https://www.urban.org/policy-
centers/cross-center-initiatives/state-and-local-finance-initiative/state-and-local-backgrounders/criminal justice -
police -corrections -courts -expenditures (last visited June 12, 2021).
33 Fola Akinnibi, Cities' Pleas for Federal Aid Run into Calls to Defund Police, Bloomberg (June 12, 2020),
https://www.bloomberg. com/news/articles/2020-06-12/cities-s-pleas-for-federal-aid-runs-into-calls-to-defund-
police.
" Carl Sullivan & Carla Baranauckas, Here's How Much Money Goes to Police Departments in Largest Cities
Across the U.S., USA Today (June 26, 2020), https://www.usatoday.conVstory/money/2020/06/26/how-much-
money-goes-to-police-departments-in-americas-largest-cities/ 112004904/.
" What Policing Costs: A Look at Spending in America's Biggest Cities, Vera,
https://www.vera.org/pubhcations/what-policing-costs-in-americas-biggest-cities (last visited June 12, 2021).
36 City Manager's Adopted Budget in Brief, City of Gainesville (Oct. 1, 2020),
https://www.cityofgainesville.org/Portals/O/bf/FY2 1 -FOP-adopted.pdf
37 Jeff Asher & Ben Horwitz, How Do the Police Actually Spend Their Time?, N.Y. Times (June 19, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/ 19/upshot/unrest-police-time-violent-crime.html.
38 Betsy Pearl, Beyond Policing: Investing in Offices of Neighborhood Safety, Ctr. for Am. Progress (Oct. 15, 2020),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/criminal justice/reports/2020/10/15/491545/beyond-policing-investing-
offices-neighborhood-safety/.
39 Asher & Horwitz, supra note 37.
" pearl, supra note 38.
13
42. Municipal departments that specialize in providing public health and social
services, on the other hand, receive a fraction of the dollars spent on policing. The ten largest cities
in the U.S. spend anywhere from two to ten times more on policing than public health expenditures,
even though health professionals have greater training than police for responding to behavioral or
mental health emergencies.41
43. While policing can account for a quarter to nearly half of a municipal budget,42 the
average city spends only 5% of funds on public housing, leaving the police to respond to conflicts
relating to homelessness rather than social services professionals who could offer targeted
resources.43 In Gainesville, with a particularly high ratio of police officers to private citizens, the
police department receives seventeen times more funding than is allocated to human services.44
44. Although the vast majority of police officers' time is spent handling to non-violent
activity, they are primarily trained for responding to violent threats rather than deescalating other
situations. The average municipal police department spends 168 hours training new officers on use
of force, self-defense, and firearm tactics while only devoting 9 hours to conflict management and
mediation.4' As a result, police officers are more conditioned to use tactics of force, rather than
de-escalation, even in response to non -emergency situations.46
41 Ellen Fassler, 10 Largest US Cities Will Spend More on Police Than Public Health This Year, TruthOut (Feb. 24,
2021), https://truthout.org/articles/10-largest-us-cities-will-spend-more-on-police-than-public-health-this-year/.
42 Vera, supra note 35.
4s Emily Badger & Quoctrung Bui, Cities Grew Safer. Police Budgets Kept Growing, N.Y. Times (June 12, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/06/12/upshot/cities-grew-safer-police-budgets-kept-growing. html.
44 Gainesville Budget, supra note 36.
41 Sarah Hansen & Haaah Touryalai, Call 911: How Police Built Military Arsenals and A Firm Grip on Local
Budgets, And Why Defunding May Be Inevitable, Forbes (June 26, 2020),
https://www. forbes.com/sites/sarahhansen/2020/06/26/call-911-how-police-built-military-arsenals-and-a-firm-grip-
on-local-budgets-and-why-defending-may-be-inevitable/?sh=204c8 ce0190.
46 Roge Karma, We Train Police to Be Warriors -And Then Send Them Out to Be Social Workers, Vox (July 31,
2020), https://www.vox.com/2020/7/31/21334190/what-police-do-defund-abolish-police-reform-training.
14
45. Studies have shown that police use of force has been disproportionately directed at
communities of color, particularly the Black community.47 A national study of nearly 5,000 fatal
police shootings between 2015 and 2020 demonstrated that police killed Black Americans at over
2.5 times the rate of white Americans and killed unarmed Black Americans at triple the rate of
unarmed white Americans.48 Florida's rate of fatal police shootings between 2015 and 2018 was
comparable to national statistics,49 and analysis of the racial disparities in police shootings found
that Black Floridians are "more likely to be shot in questionable circumstances."so
46. The summer of 2020 brought greater national attention to the disproportionate use
of police violence toward communities of color.
47. On May 25, 2020, George Floyd, a 46-year-old Black man, was murdered by
Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin, who knelt on Floyd's neck for eight minutes and forty-
six seconds as Mr. Floyd lay face -down on the street, handcuffed, gasping "I can't breathe."51
48. Just two months earlier, three plainclothes Louisville police officers forced entry
into the apartment of Breonna Taylor, a 26-year-old Black woman, and fatally shot her six times
as she slept.52
47 Elle Lett, et al., Racial Inequity in Fatal U.S. Police Shootings, 2015-2020, 75 J. Epidemiology & Cmty. Health
394 (2021), https://jech.bmj.com/contenV75/4/394; Emmanuella Asabor, et al., Fatal Police Shootings Among Black
Americans Remain High, Unchanged Since 2015, Penn. Medicine News (Oct. 28, 2020),
https://www.pennmedicine. org/news/news-releases/2020/october/fatal-police-shootings-among-black-americans-
remain-high-unchanged-since-2015.
4s Id.
49 Steve Steward, By the Numbers: Florida Police Related Shooting Fatalities, Tallahassee Reports (June 24, 2020),
https: //tallahasseereports. com/2020/06/24/by-the-numbers-florida-p o lice-related-sho oting-fatalities/.
so Ben Montgomery, Why Cops Shoot, Tampa Bay Times (2017),
https://projects.tampabay. com/proj ects/2017/investigations/florida-po lice -shootings/.
" Evan Hill, et al., How George Floyd Was Killed in Police Custody, N.Y. Times (May 31, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/3 1/us/george -floyd-investigation. html.
12 Rukmini Callimachi, Breonna Taylor's Life Was Changing. Then the Police Came to Her Door., N.Y. Times
(Aug. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/30/us/breonna-taylor-police-killing.html.
15
49. These stories and conversations about police brutality were shared in solidarity with
the Black Lives Matter movement and viewed by 1.4 billion people.53
50. These killings sparked what was deemed the largest mass movement for justice in
United States history.54 The two months following George Floyd's murder saw between 15 and 26
million Americans participate in thousands of racial justice demonstrations, many organized under
the banner of or in solidarity with the Black Lives Matter movement.55 These racial justice
demonstrations spanned over 40% of counties in the United States.56
51. Thousands of Floridians joined this call for racial justice, participating in dozens of
peaceful demonstrations across the state. In Gainesville, over 1,000 people came together to
demand police accountability in the days after Mr. Floyd's murder,57 and, in June, over 1,000
united against racial injustice in a demonstration organized by the Dream Defenders, a Black -led
organization seeking transformative justice in Florida.58
52. Both across the nation and in Florida, these calls for racial justice and for an end to
police violence against Black communities were overwhelmingly peaceful: over 95% of protests
were non-violent and involved no property damage.59
" Sam Blake, Why the George Floyd Protests Feel Different —Lots and Lots of Mobile Video, dot.la (June 12, 2020),
https://dot.la/george-floyd-video-2646171522.html?utm campaign=post-teaser&utm content=i87yytb3.
54 Larry Buchanan, et al., Black Lives Matter Maybe the Largest Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. Times (July 3,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Cindy Swirko, Marchers Call for Justice, Police Accountability, Gainesville Sun (May 30, 2020),
https://www.gainesville.com/news/20200530/marchers-call-for justice -police -accountability.
58 Ruelle Fludd & James J. Rowe, Over a Thousand People Join Protest for Black Lives in Gainesville, WCJB (June
13, 2020), https://www.wcjb.com/content/news/Thousands join-protest-for-black-lives-in-Gainesville-
571246111.html.
" Erica Chenoweth & Jeremy Pressman, This Summer's Black Lives Matter Protesters Were Overwhelmingly
Peaceful, Our Research Finds, Wash. Post. (Oct. 16, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost. com/polities/2020/10/ 16/this-summers-black-lives-matter-protesters-were-
overwhelming-peaceful-our-research-finds/.
Wei
53. This nationwide movement against racial injustice and police brutality elevated the
conversation about reimagining the model for public safety through municipal budgeting changes.
Residents have asked their local governments to reevaluate municipal spending priorities to, in
some places, reorient public safety programs to be more community -driven, and in others, reduce
the tax burden to local taxpayers, especially to the extent certain expenditures are likely to
contribute to systemic racial injustice.
IV. Municipalities throughout Florida Are Responding to Constituents by
Considering New Approaches to Funding Public Safety.
54. Municipalities across the nation have heard their residents, and city halls have
become central spaces for discussing community -based models for public safety and the
reasonableness of certain law enforcement practices and spending decisions. As a result, in 2020,
nearly half of the largest U.S. cities redirected money from the police budget to social services.60
For example, Minneapolis, Minnesota directed nearly $8 million from its police budget toward
mental health response and violence prevention programs to help vulnerable populations. 6 1 Austin,
Texas shifted $153 million from the police budget to create new social service programs, including
a "Reimagine Safety" fund, and to move non -law enforcement functions out of the police
department.62
55. In Florida, several cities listened to constituents' calls to reimagine public safety by
shifting their budgets as well.
City of Gainesville
61 See Sam Levin, These U.S. Cities Defunded Police: "We're Transferring Money to the Community, " The
Guardian (Mar. 7, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/mar/07/us-cities-defund-police-transferring-
money-community.
61 Brenna Goth & Ayanna Alexander, "Defend the Police " in Cities Faces Ire of State GOP Lawmakers, Bloomberg
Law (Mar. 16, 2021), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/social justice/defund-the-police-in-cities-faces-ire-of-state-
gop-lawmakers.
62 Levin, supra note 60.
17
56. After thousands of Gainesville residents peacefully demonstrated against racial
injustice and called for meaningful reform, the Gainesville City Commission reexamined the
Gainesville Police Department ("GPD") budget and structure.
57. This evaluation brought to light several non -law enforcement functions under the
purview of GPD. For example, the GPD Youth and Community Services Bureau included several
purely social service programs, such as the Reichert House, an afterschool enrichment program
for youth, and the B.O.L.D. Program, which provides case management and skills training for
young men between the ages of 16 and 24 with a background of prior infractions.
58. On July 13, 2020, the Gainesville City Commission directed the City Manager to
develop a proposal for reallocating non -law enforcement functions from the Gainesville Police
Department to other municipal departments and to repurpose open sworn officer positions.
59. The City Manager returned with a proposal to transfer a Fleet Manager to the
Department of Mobility and five IT positions to the Information Technology Department. The City
Commission approved this $524,902 transfer on August 10, 2020.63
60. The City Manager also proposed that two open sworn officer positions be frozen to
allow the Reichert House to hire two non -law -enforcement intervention specialists, which the City
Commission also approved on August 10, 2020.64
61. As these decreases in local law enforcement spending were made, the Gainesville
City Commission also voted to approve a $3.2 million five-year expenditure to equip officers with
functioning body cameras with the goal of increasing transparency and accountability in policing.65
63 Presentation by the Gainesville City Manager to the Gainesville City Commission (Aug. 10, 2020).
64 id.
65 See Ruelle Fludd, Gainesville approves purchase of new police body cameras, WCJB (Aug. 6, 2020),
https: //www. wcj b. com/2020/08/06/gainesville-approves-purchase-of-new-p o lice -body -cameras/.
IN
62. Although these revisions did not lead to a net decrease in the GPD's budget for the
2021 fiscal year, they started an ongoing discussion about the shifting of certain programs and
functions from the GPD to existing or new municipal departments.
63. In particular, the City of Gainesville has been shifting its budgetary resources away
from policing youth. In 2020, the Commission voted to phase out its $900,000 contribution to the
$2.1 million armed school resource officer program, so that the Alachua County School Board
would be fiscally responsible for the program and the City could spend those funds on community
activities.66
64. Gainesville is one of many cities in Florida and throughout the nation to reimagine
public safety through changes to municipal budgeting.67 The aim of these changes is to increase
the emphasis on non -law -enforcement strategies that promote the safety of all communities.
V. Governor DeSantis Proposed HB 1 to Strike Back at Florida Residents and
Municipalities Working to Reimagine a More Just Vision for Public Safety.
65. While local governments came together with their constituents to work toward
meaningful justice reform, Governor DeSantis responded by expanding the authority of Florida's
Executive Branch to commandeer these local legislative efforts and stymie reform.
66. Despite acknowledging that the demonstrations for racial justice were "largely
peaceful,"68 Governor DeSantis demonized the Floridians that stood against racial injustice and
66 See Ruelle Fludd, Gainesville city commissioners tackle school resource officer budget, WCJB (Jul. 24, 2020),
https: //www.wcj b. com/2020/07/24/gainesville-city-commissioners-reverse-cours e-on-scho ol-resource-ofiicer-
budget-for-fy-2021 /.
61 See Sam Levin, These U.S. Cities Defunded Police: "We're Transferring Money to the Community, " The
Guardian (Mar. 7, 2021), https://www.theguardian.conVus-news/2021/mar/07/us-cities-defund-police-transferring-
money-community.
68 News Release, Governor Ron DeSantis Reports that Florida Demonstrations Have Remained Largely Peaceful
Over Last 24 Hours (June 2, 2020), https://www.flgov.com/2020/06/02/governor-ron-desantis-reports-that-florida-
demonstrations-have-remained-largely-peaceful-over-past-24-hours/.
19
police brutality as "crazed lunatics"69 and "angry mobs."70 Within the first two weeks of peaceful
gathering, the Governor mobilized 700 Florida National Guard soldiers against his own
constituents.71
67. Governor DeSantis disparaged any local budget reforms aimed at adjusting
municipal law enforcement spending as "insane theor[ies].i72 The Governor vowed that these local
democratic initiatives were "not going to be allowed to ever carry the day in the state of Florida."73
68. True to his word, on September 21, 2020, Governor DeSantis held a press
conference where he announced the "Combating Violence, Disorder, and Looting, and Law
Enforcement Protection Act," also known as HB 1, a "very robust package" of different criminal
penalties for individuals associated with "disorderly assemblies" as well as separate budgeting
restrictions for municipalities engaging in public safety reform.74
69. Governor DeSantis did not deny that HB 1 would chill political speech. Rather, he
made clear that a major goal of HB 1 was to ensure that "a ton of bricks rain down" on
demonstrators, so that "people ... think twice about engaging in this type of conduct" after the
summer of 2020's public movement for racial justice.75
69 Rev, Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis Press Conference Transcript: Harsher Penalties for Violent Protesters (Sept. 21,
2020), https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/florida-gov-ron-desantis-press-conference-transcript-harsher-penalties-
for-violent-protesters.
70 News Releases, Office of Gov. Ron DeSantis, WHAT THEYARE SAYING: Gov. Ron DeSantis Signs Hallmark
Anti -Rioting Legislation Taking Unapologetic Stand for Public Safety (Apr. 19, 2021),
https://www. flgov.com/2021/04/19/what-they-are-saying-govemor-ron-desantis-signs-hallmark-anti-rioting-
legislation-taking-unapologetic-stand-for-pub lic-safety/.
71 Id.
72 DeSantis Signs `Anti -Riot' Bill into Law, YouTube (Apr. 19, 2021), https://www.youtube.convwatch?v=
Tz7gITKczNl.
73 Id.
74 Rev, supra note 69.
75 Id.
all
70. Governor DeSantis also stated that a separate and additional goal of HB 1 was to
preempt local efforts to deliver meaningful budgetary reforms. HB 1 would not permit municipal
governments to exercise control over their budget priorities to shift any funds from law
enforcement to other public services.76
71. Immediately, the Florida public raised alarm about the political motivations
underlying HB 1's heightened sanctions of protest activities. Indeed, the Miami Herald Editorial
Board warned that HB 1 "will have deadly consequences and, as history has shown, Black and
brown people will likely pay the price. ,77
72. Many municipal leaders also opposed HB 1's budgeting provisions aimed at
hindering public safety reform. The Florida League of Cities publicly opposed HB 1.78 Twenty-
eight local elected officials from throughout Florida wrote to the state legislature and Governor
opposing HB 1 because it would allow "partisan statewide officer[s] to line -item -veto local,
nonpartisan budgets."79
73. Nonetheless, following the Governor's direction to make HB 1 a "focal point"80 of
the 2021 legislative session, the Florida Legislature took steps to fast -track the bill to passage.
76 Id.
77 The Miami Herald Editorial Board, Could anything be worse than Florida's Stand Your Ground? Yes, a new,
racist legislative proposal, Miami Herald (Feb. 11, 2021),
https://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/editorials/article24913 8640.htn-fl.
78 Fla. League of Cities, Combating Public Disorder (Oppose - Impact on Municipal Operations) (Jan. 28, 2021),
https://www.fleities.com/blog/legislative-bulletin/2021 /01 /28/combating-public-disorder-(oppose-impact-on-
municip al-operations)01-2 8-2021-10-02 -49.
79 Letter from 28 local elected officials to the Florida State Legislature and Governor Ron DeSantis (Mar. 23, 2021),
https:Hlocalprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/LPFL-Opposes-HB 1-SB484.pdf.
81 Wilson, Kirby, Ron DeSantis: Any Municipality that Defends' Police Will Lose State Funding, Tampa Bay Times
(Sept. 21, 2020), https://www.tampabay.com/news/florida-politics/2020/09/21/ron-desantis-any-municipality-that-
defunds-police-will-lose-state-funding/.
21
74. After HB 1 passed the Florida House of Representatives, State Senator Danny
Burgess introduced the bill in the Senate even while acknowledging HB 1 could be misapplied,
could be enforced in a racially discriminatory manner, and might be wielded against peaceful
protesters.81 Despite these significant concerns, State Senate President Wilton Simpson limited
public comment to a single session.82
75. Local officials and the public at large found it difficult to engage meaningfully with
their representatives due to restrictions on meeting with legislators that were ostensibly imposed
and maintained throughout the duration of the 2021 legislative session due to the COVID-19
pandemic.83
76. Yet, with enormous support from the Governor's office and without a single
committee hearing fully open to the public, HB 1 was signed into law by Governor DeSantis on
April 19, 2021.sa
77. The passage of HB 1 amended several criminal statutes to heighten penalties related
to protesting and created new protest -related offenses:
a. Section 2 prohibits the willful obstruction of traffic with language broad
enough to criminalize standing on the street and temporarily hindering traffic.
" News Service of Florida, Protest bill backed in Florida Senate after emotional debate, Orlando Sentinel (Apr. 9,
2021), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/politics/os-ne-riot-bill-florida-senate-20210409-
3 no gdsp usrb aj b de 3 3 vo 3 uaa5 m- story. html .
82Florida Senate Committee, Committee on Appropriations (Apr. 9, 2021),
https://www. flsenate, gov/mediaNideoPlayer?EventlD=1_3wpkrnbb-20210409083O&Redirectrtrue.
83 Skyler Swisher, Florida may be an 'oasis offreedom' in COVID reopenings—but the Capitol is still locked down,
South Florida Sun Sentinel (Apr. 21, 2021); James Call, Controversial bills, a closed Capitol: How COVID defined
Florida's 2021 legislative session, Tallahassee Democrat (Apr. 29, 2021); see also Patricia Brigham & Pamela C.
Marsh, Florida lawmakers used COVID as excuse to ignore public opinion, Florida First Amendment Foundation
(May 4, 2021).
14 The Florida Senate, HB-1 Bill History, https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2021/1/?Tab=BillHistory (accessed
May 26, 2021).
22
b. Section 8 creates a new first -degree misdemeanor offense for "mob
intimidation," which prohibits one person "assembled with two or more other persons and
acting with a common intent, to use force or threaten to use imminent force, to compel or
induce, or attempt to compel or induce, another person to do or refrain from doing any act
or to assume, abandon, or maintain a particular viewpoint against his or her will," a charge
that could be levied against those who successfully convince others to change their
viewpoint in the course of a demonstration.
C. Section 14 prohibits cyber-intimidation by publishing an individual's
identity, including a public official, with intent for a third party to threaten, harass or
commit violence against that person. This could allow individuals to be prosecuted for
publicly criticizing a political official on an online forum, for example.
d. Section 15 makes a person "who participates in a public disturbance
involving an assembly of three of more people acting with a common intent to mutually
assist each other in disorderly and violent conduct resulting in injury or damage to another
person or property or creating a clear and present danger of injury to another person or
property" liable for a third-degree felony charge, punishable by up to five years in prison.
Section 15 does not define "participation," so this third-degree felony charge could be
levied against peaceful protestors who find themselves in close proximity to an act of
violence or property destruction or who are defending themselves against attack from law
enforcement or counter -protesters.
e. Section 16 withholds bail from individuals arrested for breaching the peace,
in effect guaranteeing that protesters will spend at least one night in jail.
23
f. Section 18 creates an affirmative defense to civil liability against wrongful
death, personal injury, and property damage for individuals who used force against
someone convicted of an aggravated riot. Accordingly, those protesting racial injustice
could be convicted of an aggravated riot while counter -protesters who use violence against
them would have an affirmative defense.
V1. HB 1 Strips Municipalities of Budget -Setting Authority and Concentrates
Power to Appropriate Law Enforcement Funds in the Executive Branch.
78. In addition to these individual criminal penalties, HB 1 creates a new mechanism
by which the Executive Branch can commandeer the municipal budgeting process and unilaterally
require cities to maintain the prior levels of funding for law enforcement.
79. Section 1 provides that "[i]f the tentative budget of any municipality contains a
funding reduction to the operating budget of the law enforcement agency," that reduction may be
contested by either the state attorney —an executive official --or a single dissenting member of the
municipality's governing body within 30 days of the publication of the tentative budget on the
municipality's official website.
80. Section 1 provides no definition of what constitutes a funding reduction. Section 1
could be construed broadly to cover pension or other capital expenditures. Further, there is no
clarification as to whether Section 1 would be triggered by any isolated line -item reduction to the
operating budget or whether the reduction must lead to a net reduction of the operating budget.
Ultimately, without any definition of a "funding reduction," any number of changes to the law
enforcement budget could provide the basis for the state executive's commandeering mechanism.
81. Any challenge to such a "funding reduction" shall be filed with the Executive
Office of the Governor and set forth the municipality's tentative budget, the municipality's
24
operating budget for law enforcement from the previous year, and state the reasons for the
challenge. A copy of the challenge will also be served on the municipality's governing body.
82. The municipality is provided only five working days to file a written reply to the
Executive Office of the Governor, and HB 1 provides no further role for the municipality as its
budget is reviewed by the state executive branch.
83. Upon receipt of the municipality's reply, the Executive Office of the Governor will
take up the request, independently convene a budget hearing, and issue a report of its own findings
and recommendations to the Administration Commission, chaired by the Governor and composed
of the members of his cabinet,85 which then has 30 days to make final budgeting decisions for the
municipality.
84. HB 1 empowers the Governor and his cabinet to "amend or modify the [municipal]
budget as to each separate item of the municipal law enforcement agency" without any further
input from the municipality itself or its residents. HB 1 does not provide any standards to guide or
limit how the Governor and his cabinet evaluate, amend, or modify budgets. Instead, it confers
unfettered discretion.
85. Any amendments or modifications made by the Governor and his cabinet to the
municipal budget "shall be final." The scope of potential judicial review is so narrow —limited to
whether the Administration Commission "depart[ed] ... from the essential requirements of law"
that it provides little recourse to a municipality that objects to the budget expenditures mandated
by the Governor and his cabinet.
86. The modified budget decreed by the Governor and his cabinet is given binding legal
effect. Accordingly, upon receipt of this state -revised budget, the municipality is forced to expend
" Fla. Stat. § 14.202.
25
funds it otherwise would not have spent at all or would have spent elsewhere to fulfill the state's
mandate.
87. The budget takeover process established by HB 1 does not provide any special
consideration for the many reasons why a municipality would need to make a reduction for its law
enforcement funding, such as growth in demand for municipal services outpacing local tax
revenues, the expiration of one-time expenditures or grants, across-the-board fiscal conservatism,
or rebalancing investment in needed social services.
88. Essentially, if there is a reduction to the municipal law enforcement budget —no
matter the reason or need for the changeHB 1 allows for the municipality's budget to be wrested
from its control by a state official (or a single dissenting local official), put to the judgment of the
Executive Office of the Governor, which does not have familiarity with the day-to-day operations
of the municipality, and then revised line -by-line by the Governor and his cabinet with no further
recourse.
89. HB 1 is not comparable to any other Administration Commission appeal process
because it imposes a state commandeering process on a purely local budgeting process. The
Florida Legislature has authorized the Administration Commission to hear appeals of budgeting
items that relate to intergovernmental programs —such as the comprehensive plan, which involves
collaboration of the state land planning agency, regional water district, Florida Department of
Environmental Protection, Florida Department of State, and Florida Department of Transportation
as well as a local government86—or state constitutional officers, such as the sheriff.17 The
municipal budgeting process, however, is a purely local process committed to municipalities
through home rule.
86 Fla. Stat. 163.1384.
87 Fla. Stat. 30.49.
00
90. No part of HB 1's state commandeering process involves consultation with the
municipality or provides for engagement with the municipality's residents. Rather, HB 1 allows
the Governor and his cabinet to mandate that a municipality fund law enforcement according to
the Governor's vision, rather than applying the considered judgment of local elected officials and
advancing the best interests of the municipality and its residents.
VH. Because of HB 1, Florida Municipalities Cannot Structure Their Budgets to
Meet the Municipalities' Needs or Respond to Constituents' Calls for
Reform.
91. Municipalities in Florida are currently finalizing their FY 2022 budgets in
consultation with a variety of municipal officials —from city managers to municipal department
heads —and community members. This process involves weighing the municipalities' projected
revenues and evaluating community needs and priorities.
92. Because HB 1 provides no guidance or clarification about what qualifies as a
reduction subject to its provisions, it injects uncertainty into nonpartisan municipal budgeting
discussions.
93. As of this filing, the Governor continues to change the rules governing the
application of HB 1's municipal budgeting provisions. On June 15, 2021, in a session with his
cabinet, Governor DeSantis signed off on initial rules that would also allow a county sheriff to
challenge a reduction of the law enforcement budget under HB 1. Attorney General Moody has
been directed to publish a notice of final rule.S8
88 Matt Dixon, Florida Panel Paves Way for Law Enforcement to Appeal Local Police Budget Cuts, Politico (June
15, 2021), https://www.politico.com/states/florida/story/2021/06/15/florida-panel-paves-way-for-law-enforcement-
to-appeal-local-police-budget-cuts-13 86464.
WA
94. In light of these ambiguous and evolving circumstances, it is infeasible for
municipalities to know what the scope of their authority is to adjust the law enforcement budget
to fit with municipal revenue and priorities.
95. Municipal leaders have described the chilling effect of HB 1 on their nonpartisan
budgeting discussions: Mayor Lauren Poe of Gainesville stated in a Commission meeting that he
"feel[s] intimidated and threatened by [HB I]" and believes that he is "being told [he] cannot make
government decisions."89
96. HB 1 has impacted municipalities' evaluation of previously discussed budgetary
options that could affect the law enforcement budget. Absent HB 1, municipalities would be free
to consider all budgetary options before them and choose the option that best fits the municipality's
circumstances and their residents' needs and values.
City of Gainesville
97. After directing the City Manager to examine possibilities for transferring non -law -
enforcement expenditures from the GPD budget to other municipal departments on July 13, 2020,
Gainesville city leaders have engaged in multiple discussions surrounding the possible transfer of
youth mentorship programs from the GPD budget.
98. Several youth services programs that are currently under the purview of GPD have
little to do with law enforcement. For example, the Reichert House, an after -school program for
male youth between 2nd and 12th grade, provides educational support and enrichment as well as
mentorship from intervention specialists and involves no provision of law enforcement, even
though it is a program within GPD.
89 Alexander Lugo, Gainesville City Commissioners Take First Step In Potential Lawsuit over House Bill 1,
Independent Florida Alligator (May 24, 2021), https://www.alligator.org/article/2021/05/hb1lawsuit.
m
99. Similarly, the B.O.L.D. program describes itself as a "community -based
organization" that does not involve law enforcement activity, but rather provides mental health,
counseling, and job training services to formerly incarcerated youth between the ages of 16 and
24.
100. The Gainesville City Commission had been evaluating whether to transfer these
youth services programs to another municipal department or create a separate Youth Services
Department. Recently, the Gainesville City Commission directed the City Manager to provide a
variety of options to the Commission to accomplish these ends, including options that would lead
to reductions of the GPD budget.
101. HB 1 burdens the Gainesville City Commission's consideration of these options.
Prior to HB 1, the City Commission could focus on which budgetary options were in the best
interests of the City of Gainesville and its residents. Now considerations must adjust to avoid
triggering HB 1's commandeering process. Because HB 1 fails to provide legislative standards
that could give municipalities notice of what reductions could trigger commandeering and how the
State Executive could wield this authority, there is no way to reliably predict what path that will
avoid commandeering.
102. This lack of clarity and the powerful deterrence caused by commandeering inject
uncertainty into the local budgeting process and impact the Gainesville City Commission's
ongoing deliberation and structuring of its FY 22 budget.
103. By making the Gainesville budget subject to unilateral revision by the Governor
and his cabinet, HB 1 utterly disregards Florida's strict separation -of -powers principles and
directly threatens the core home rule authority guaranteed to Gainesville by the Florida
Constitution, statute, and the City's charter.
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CAUSES OF ACTION
COUNT I — Separation of Powers
(Art. II, Sec. 3 of the Fla. Constitution)
104. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference the allegations contained in
paragraphs 1 through 103 inclusive, as if fully set forth herein.
105. This count is an action for injunctive relief, pursuant to Section 26.012 of the
Florida Statutes, and a declaratory judgment, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 86.011, et. seq., seeking a
declaration from the Court that HB 1 violates the separation of powers under Article II, Section 3
of the Florida Constitution.
106. The Florida Constitution divides the powers of the state government into three
branches —legislative, executive, and judicial —and prohibits any branch from "exercis[ing] any
power appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided [by the constitution]."
Fla. Const. art. II, § 3. Additionally, no branch may delegate its constitutionally assigned power to
another branch. See Smith v. State, 537 So. 2d 982, 987 (Fla. 1989).
107. To the limited extent that the state government has authority to restrict local
government power, the Florida Constitution confers this authority exclusively upon valid exertions
of legislative power. See, e.g., Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 915-19 (Fla. 1978).
108. Furthermore, the power to appropriate public funds is a "fundamentally legislative
task" and appropriations must be passed through "duly enacted statutes" rather than through
executive administrative decisions. Chiles v. Child. A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So. 2d 260, 265 (Fla.
1991). Likewise, the power to "reduce appropriations" is a legislative function. Florida House of
Representatives v. Martinez, 555 So.2d 839, 845 (Fla. 1990).
109. HB 1 impermissibly delegates both of these legislative powers to the executive. HB
1's budgeting review process limits local authority by allowing the state to unilaterally revise the
30
municipal budget. If the Florida Constitution allows the State to engage in such at all, then this
review is a legislative function that the Florida Constitution does not authorize for delegation to
another branch.
110. HB 1's budgeting review process also allows the Administration Commission to
make appropriations decisions that are fundamentally legislative in character. The Florida
Constitution does not authorize the legislature to delegate to the executive branch "its authority to
make decisions regarding the purposes for which public funds may or may not be applied." Chiles,
589 So. 2d at 265.
111. This impermissible delegation of legislative power interferes with Plaintiffs' ability
to balance their operational budgets and also interferes with Plaintiffs' ability to make fiscal
decisions consistent with the political will of their constituents.
112. Because Section 1 of HB 1 impermissibly commits legislative functions to the
executive branch, it violates Article II, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution. Section 1 of HB 1
should be enjoined in its entirety.
113. The Court should also declare that HB 1 violates the separation of powers principles
articulated in Article II, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution.
COUNT II — Nondelmation Doctrine
114. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference the allegations contained in
paragraphs 1 through 102 inclusive, as if fully set forth herein.
115. This count is an action for injunctive relief, pursuant to Section 26.012 of the
Florida Statutes, and a declaratory judgment, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 86.011, et. seq., seeking a
declaration from the Court that HB 1 violates the nondelegation doctrine.
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116. Even assuming the legislative branch can delegate its power to appropriate public
funds and control municipal budgets to the executive branch (which it cannot), this specific
delegation is impermissible due to lack of standards relating to the review by the Administration
Commission. This dearth of standards is particularly problematic in light of HB 1's unprecedented
re -assignment of legislative powers.
117. Under Florida law, the nondelegation doctrine requires that "fundamental and
primary policy decisions" be made by "members of the legislature." Askew, 372 So. 2d at 925.
118. Legislation delegating the administration of legislative programs "must be pursuant
to some minimal standards and guidelines ascertainable by reference to the enactment establishing
the program." Askew, 372 So. 2d at 925. When legislation is "so lacking in guidelines that neither
the agency nor the court can determine whether the agency is carrying out the intent of the
legislature in its conduct" then the agency is exercising the core legislative power of policymaking,
rather than its constitutionally assigned power of administering the law. Id.
119. The guidelines accompanying legislative delegation to an administrative agency
"must clearly announce adequate standards to guide.. . in the execution of the powers delegated."
S. All. for Clean Energy v. Graham, 113 So. 3d 742, 748 (Fla. 2013). The statute delegating the
power must "so clearly define the power delegated that the administrative agency is precluded
from acting through whim, showing favoritism, or exercising unbridled discretion." Id.
120. Delegation of legislative functions may pass facial constitutional muster if
accompanied by "[c]arefully crafted legislation establishing, among other things, the extent to
which appropriations may be reduced, coupled with a recitation of reduction priorities and
provisions for legislative oversight." Chiles, 589 So. 2d at 268.
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121. HB 1 contains no discernible standards or guidelines for the Administration
Commission to follow in carrying out the legislature's intent. It does not identify when municipal
law enforcement budgets should be overridden, by how much, or under what conditions.
122. Section 1 merely provides that the Administration Commission "shall approve the
action of the governing body of the municipality or amend or modify the budget as to each separate
item within the operating budget of the municipal law enforcement agency." When the budget
control provisions are triggered by complaint, HB 1 allows the Administration Commission full
discretion to edit and revise the law enforcement portions of a municipal budget as they see fit.
123. Because HB 1 fails to provide guidelines, the amount Plaintiffs' budget lines could
be revised by is variable and unpredictable. Additionally, HB 1's lack of standards allows the
Administration Commission to override the considered legislative judgment of municipal bodies
for any reason or no reason at all.
124. Plaintiffs' budgeting discussions are currently impacted by the presence of this state
commandeering process. Should Plaintiffs reduce their law enforcement budget, they can expect
based on the Governor's stated position, to have their budget lines overridden. Thus, Plaintiffs can
only avoid this interference by, at a minimum, maintaining the past year's level of law enforcement
funding.
125. Because Section 1 of HB 1 impermissibly commits unfettered legislative discretion
to the executive branch, it violates the nondelegation doctrine. Section 1 of HB 1 should be
enjoined in its entirety.
126. The Court should also declare that HB 1 violates the nondelegation doctrine.
COUNT III — Single Subject Rule
(Art. III, Sec. 6 of Fla. Constitution)
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127. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference the allegations contained in
paragraphs 1 through 103 inclusive, as if fully set forth herein.
128. This count is an action for injunctive relief, pursuant to Section 26.012 of the
Florida Statutes, and a declaratory judgment, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 86.011, et. seq., seeking a
declaration from the Court that HB 1 violates the single subject rule contained in Article III, section
6 of the Florida Constitution.
129. Article III, section 6 of the Florida Constitution provides that "every law shall
embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, and the subject shall be briefly
expressed in the title."
130. The subject of an act may be wide ranging, but there must be "a natural or logical
connection" between the various sections within a law. Chenoweth v. Kemp, 396 So. 2d 1122,
1124 (Fla. 1981) (quoting Bd. of Pub. Instruction v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969)).
131. The legislature must include a preamble in complex legislation that connects
disparate subject matter of the legislation. See, e.g., Smith v. Department oflnsurance, 507 So. 2d
1080, 1087-89 (Fla. 1987); Burch v. State, 558 So. 2d 1, 2-3 (Fla. 1990).
132. The title of an act must express the "real purpose" of the legislation and cannot be
misleading or deceptively vague. Butler v. Perry, 67 Fla. 405, 410-11 (1914); see also Fine v.
Moran, 74 Fla. 417 (1917); Stokes v. Galloway, 61 Fla. 437 (1911).
133. HB 1 combines two distinct and unrelated legal objects in one law. Section 1
restricts municipal authority by creating a mechanism for state review of the law enforcement
budget. Sections 2, 3, 8, 14, 15, 16, and 18 impose heightened criminal penalties upon individuals
related to protest activities.
34
134. There is no "natural or logical connection" between Section 1 and Sections 2, 3, 8,
14, 15, 16 and 18. Section 1 impacts municipal authority while Sections 2, 3, 8, 14, 15, 16, and 18
affect individual liberty. Section 1 has nothing to do with protest activities while Sections 2, 3, 8,
14, 15, 16, and 18 have nothing to do with municipal budgeting for law enforcement.
135. The Legislature has given no explanation of the logical nexus between those
sections, nor does the text of HB 1 include a preamble explaining how the budget provisions
connect to the anti -protest provisions.
136. Further, the title of HB 1 is misleading and deceptively vague. The title of HB 1
does not briefly express the subjects of the legislation as the municipal law enforcement budget
provisions are not expressed in "[a]n act relating to combating public disorder."
137. Because HB 1 includes multiple subjects that are neither properly connected nor
expressed in its title, it violates the single subject rule and accordingly should be enjoined.
138. The Court should also declare that HB 1 violates Article Ill, Section 6 of the Florida
Constitution.
COUNT IV — Unfunded Mandate
(Article VII, Sec. 18 of the Fla. Constitution)
139. Plaintiff repeat and incorporate by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs
1 through 102 inclusive, as if fully set forth herein.
140. This count is an action for injunctive relief, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 26.012, and a
declaratory judgment, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 86.011 et. seq., seeking a declaration from the Court
that HB 1 violates the unfunded mandate rule guaranteed under Article VII, Section 18 of the
Florida Constitution.
141. The Florida Constitution broadly prohibits the state from passing an unfunded
mandate —in other words "any general law requiring such county or municipality to spend funds
35
or to take an action requiring the expenditure of funds"subj ect to limited exceptions. Fla. Const.
art. VII, § 18.
142. The legislature may only require a municipality to take an action involving an
expenditure of funds where such a requirement both "fulfills an important state interest" and where
the legislature has either (1) ensured that funds have been appropriated to cover such an
expenditure, (2) authorized the municipality to create a funding source not previously available to
it that can cover the cost, or (3) approved the expenditure by a two -third majority in each house of
the legislature. An unfunded mandate will also be deemed acceptable if (4) the expenditure stems
from compliance with a law that applies to all persons similarly situated or (5) the expenditure is
required by a federal law or federal grant conditions that contemplate municipal action. Fla. Const.
art. VII, § 18.
143. HB 1 requires a municipality to expend funds in order to maintain the previous
year's funding of the law enforcement budget or else risk the State seizing budgetary control from
the municipality and line -editing the budget without the municipality's consent or collaboration.
Already this commandeering mechanism is impacting Plaintiffs' budgetary considerations for FY
22 and serves as a powerful deterrent against reducing or reallocating law enforcement funding.
144. The outcome of HB 1's review process also necessarily requires a municipality to
spend funds because final decisions by the Administration Commission direct municipalities to
pass a particular budget item or otherwise give a budget item legal effect. Accordingly, if the
Administration Commission denies a proposed reduction of the law enforcement budget, then it
requires the municipality to expend funds to offset the denied reduction. Likewise, if the
Administration Commission amends or modifies any line item of the law enforcement budget, it
requires the municipality to expend funds as it otherwise would not have. And even if the
36
Administration Commission approves a proposed reduction, this gives the reduction final legal
effect and amounts to a state command that the municipality expend funds. Thus, any outcome of
the Administration Commission review process translates to a mandate to expend funds.
145. HB 1 does not qualify for any of the narrow exceptions to the Florida Constitution's
prohibition of unfunded mandates. As an overarching matter, nowhere on the face of HB 1, does
the legislature state that its unfunded mandate "fulfills an important state interest."
146. Nor has the Legislature undertaken any of the steps that could justify an unfunded
mandate:
a. The Legislature has not appropriated any state funds to support
municipalities maintaining the previous year's funding of law enforcement
b. The Legislature has not authorized any municipality to create a new funding
stream to cover the cost of maintaining the previous year's level of law enforcement
spending.
C. HB 1 was not passed by a two-thirds majority in each house of the
legislature: The Florida House passed HB 1 with a 57.5% majority while the Florida Senate
passed HB 1 with a 66.1% majority (just under two thirds).90
147. Maintaining the previous year's level of law enforcement funding is not necessary
to comply with any generally applicable law that applies equally to all persons. HB 1's expenditure
requirements are targeted at municipalities that make certain budgetary decisions.
148. Maintaining the previous year's level of law enforcement funding additionally is
not required by federal law or to maintain eligibility for any federal grant.
9' The Florida Senate, supra note 84.
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149. Because HB 1's municipal budgeting provision constitutes an unfunded mandate
and satisfies none of the narrow exceptions to the general prohibition of unfunded mandates, it
violates Article VII, Section 18 of the Florida Constitution. Section 1 of HB 1 should be enjoined
in its entirety.
150. Section 1 of HB 1 should also be declared unconstitutional under Article VII,
Section 18 of the Florida Constitution.
COUNT V — Home Rule
(Art. VIII, Sec. 2 of the Fla. Constitution)
151. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference the allegations contained in
paragraphs 1 through 102 inclusive, as if fully set forth herein.
152. This count is an action for injunctive relief, pursuant to Section 26.012 of the
Florida Statutes, and a declaratory judgment, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 86.011, et. seq., seeking a
declaration from the Court that HB 1 violates the home rule amendment under Article VIII, Section
2 of the Florida Constitution.
153. Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the Florida Constitution guarantees that
"[m]unicipahties shall have government, corporate, and proprietary powers to enable them to
conduct municipal government, perform municipal functions, and render municipal services." The
purpose of this constitutional protection of home rule is to "give municipalities inherent power to
meet municipal needs." Thomas v. State, 614 So. 2d 468, 472 (Fla. 1993).
154. The Florida Supreme Court has ratified a "broad construction of municipal powers"
under Article VIII, Section 2(b). Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. City of Gainesville, 918 So. 2d 250, 263
(Fla. 2005). Core to a municipality's authority is the ability to expend municipal funds for the
general welfare of its residents. See City of Boca Raton v. Gidman, 440 So. 2d 1277, 1281-82 (Fla.
1983); City of Gainesville v. Bd. of Control, 81 So. 2d 514, 518 (Fla. 1955).
:
155. Plaintiffs' ability to carry out core budgeting functions and determine municipal
expenditures is impacted by HB 1. Not only do HB 1's vague provisions inject uncertainty into
the municipal budgeting process, but also HB 1 deters Plaintiffs from reducing law enforcement
spending by imposing a state commandeering process.
156. Because Section 1 of HB 1 effectively prevents municipalities from structuring
their budget in response to the needs of their constituents, it violates Article VIII, Section 2 of the
Florida Constitution. Section 1 of HB 1 should be enjoined in its entirety.
157. Accordingly, the Court should declare that Section 1 of HB 1 violates the home rule
amendment under Article VIII, Section 2 of the Florida Constitution.
Court:
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing facts and arguments, Plaintiffs request that the
a) Declare that Section 1 of HB 1 violates the Florida Constitution as all of the
elements necessary to support declaratory relief are present:
1) As HB 1 impacts Plaintiffs' ability to pass a budget to serve the needs of
their constituents, there is a bona fide, actual, present need for a declaration
that HB 1 is invalid and unconstitutional;
2) Given the ongoing and imminent harms to Plaintiffs as they are currently
structuring their FY 22 budget, the declaration sought deals with a present
controversy as to an ascertainable set of facts;
3) Plaintiffs' constitutional rights, powers, and privileges are dependent upon
the law applicable to the facts because HB 1 implicates Plaintiffs' budgeting
power and right to be free from unfunded mandates;
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4) The Plaintiffs and the Defendants have an actual, present, adverse and
antagonistic interest in the subject matter of this Complaint;
5) The antagonistic and adverse interests are all before this Court; and
6) Because of the facts described in the foregoing paragraphs, an actual,
present and justiciable controversy has arisen between Plaintiff cities and
Defendants concerning Plaintiffs' ability to propose and pass municipal
budgets;
b) Permanently enjoin Defendants from enforcing, utilizing, or otherwise invoking
Section 1 of HB 1; and
Dated:
c) Grant any relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
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